The Eastern Partnership: Helping Out the Neighbours

But which tool is the right one?

On 7 May the ill-fated Czech Premier Mirek Topolanek, will spend his penultimate day in the post hosting a summit in Prague to launch the Eastern Partnership. Originally put forward by Poland and Sweden as a new way to enhance EU cooperation with 6 former Soviet states, it is now one of a number of regional initiatives billed as flagship proposals by the Presidencies that launched them. But considering the EU’s unconvincing record in achieving a common foreign policy and the current financial turbulence, can these initiatives result in anything more than grand exercises in PR? In this particular case, we should believe that it can.

These grand initiatives are a symptom of a larger problem that is the rotating Presidency of the EU – an institution which may or may not become a thing of the past come this autumn’s referendum in Ireland. Allotting only 6 months to each country results in them then struggling to somehow impose some of their own priorities onto the Council agenda and then attempting to make their mark and be remembered.

Last summer, President Sarkozy opened his own stint chairing the European Council by launching the Union for the Mediterranean that brought together the 27 Member States with 17 other nations that border the Mediterranean Sea. This new ‘Union’ was to obtain its own its own secretariat and co-Presidency and would focus on implementing a whole array of joint projects. With the end of Paris’ turn heading the table, however, the initiative lost steam. The last European Council called on work on its establishment to be resumed.

The French initiative seems to have inspired a trend of similar ideas and the Swedes are planning to set up a Baltic Sea Strategy for the second half of 2009 as a priority, creating yet another group structure, whereas now is the turn of the Czechs. For a Presidency, such schemes offer an opportunity to invite the European Council and a number of foreign dignitaries to a grand spectacle that cannot fail to impress domestic constituents.

For smaller Member States like the Czech Republic, this is all the more important as was proven when the now caretaker prime minister was specifically given until this summit to lead the government in order to avoid disruption. Non-EU countries benefit as their regions are placed at the top of the EU agenda, but that is of little use if they then effectively vanish from it after 6 months.

The Eastern Partnership, involving Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan is broadly speaking supposed to secure “stability and prosperity” to these countries on Europe’s Eastern frontier by increasing financial assistance by €600m over the next four years, opening EU markets by negotiating trade deals, moving towards visa liberalisation and generally increasing the level of dialogue.

Many would argue this is not the most fortuitous time to be launching anything there on such a scale. The region in question has been hit hard by the crisis: The Hryvnia, the Ukrainian currency, has fallen by 50% and the country is facing a possible default. Azerbaijan had planned for high oil prices that have since collapsed, in Armenia there’s talk of a possible IMF emergency loan and across the region the dramatic fall of Russian demand has potentially catastrophic consequences. Any previously calculated EU funding now seem almost like peanuts.

As Tomas Valasek of the Centre for European Reform recently wrote, the financial crisis will have other adverse effects on the success or otherwise of this project: irrespective of how many initiatives and statements on European solidarity are agreed upon, protectionism could well appear in some form. This will decrease the EU’s credibility in trade negotiations. Central Europeans, who are the strongest backers of the Eastern Partnership proposals, are also the worst hit by the crisis in the EU so will be hard pressed to support re-directing desperately needed funds elsewhere. Moreover, there is the perception among the participating states that the EU has failed to help financially whereas Russia has promised large loans, which they so desperately need.

In such conditions it seems almost too easy just to dismiss these countries altogether as unstable states which only pay lip service to European reform. It is true after all that in Moldova angry voters have just torched the Parliament, progressively more Georgians want nothing less than their president’s resignation, Belarusian and Azeri concessions to their oppositions are a joke and Ukrainian politics resemble a school playground at best.

But then this set of neighbours is at once more important than most, whilst also being those the European Union can actually positively affect. Whether it is in terms of stemming illegal migration, calming an assertive Russia or most significantly, ensuring energy security, these countries are important for all Member States and the EU as a whole. Europe cannot afford to just leave them be.

In the struggle for influence, Russia has claimed its stake on the region by invading or offering to lend large sums. But a pro-active EU will always ultimately be more attractive. European soft power has been proven to work with lasting effect in the Enlargement process, which is why Central Europeans have tried to allude to those effects when supporting this renewal of relations with their neighbours.

As the Czech Europe Minister recently said, comparing the Eastern Partnership with the Union for the Mediterranean that was conceived as an alternative to membership, “the scheme was designed to bridge the period between today and the distant future” that could perhaps see the start of membership talks. These countries will indeed now see that programmes and agreements that were previously only for candidates will be available to them.

And although the financial crisis has hurt the EU, it has hurt these countries and Russia to a far greater extent. The EU still has more resources and credibility to help, making this perhaps the most opportune moment to show Europe’s neighbours the value of partnership.

The promised funds should be specifically targeted and expertise shared to get the eastern economies back on their feet - overlapping programmes that are now run concurrently by several Member States should be consolidated and better coordinated; special representatives must become more pro-actively involved in solving seemingly intractable problems and conflicts that have served only to hurt their people; more students should come to Europe to participate in the Erasmus programme. These all have to be well coordinated and well publicised. The EU must be visibly seen to be benefitting these six countries’ populations and pro-actively so.

Admittedly in intention, the Eastern Partnership is nothing new, but it is a new start and one at a time when the region needs help. Membership of the EU is a very far-off prospect for these countries, but the extension of the EU’s wide-ranging tool box should not be. Soft power that has been so successful in the candidate countries can be extended, albeit in a different manner, to Europe’s neighbours, which can only be to Europe’s benefit.

Perhaps other similar initiatives could also succeed, although it is not advisable for every Presidency to insist on such ambitious undertakings. What we do know is that come 7 May, there will be an opportunity to reset relations with a more consolidated and committed approach to create more stable and loyal Eastern neighbours. Or it could end up as a spectacle of EU leaders dining with dictators to discuss empty promises. We should hope this opportunity is not wasted.